(and this post is not a callout 這 po 文也不是在嗆聲)
(written in response to this post)
(回復這個 po 文)
I think I define “callout” in an unusually neutral way in comparison to most other people. For me, it doesn't matter whether it's said in private or public, online or offline, a callout is just when you tell someone that something they did potentially or actually caused harm. I use “harm” as an umbrella term to refer to any behavior that threatens or damages someone else's autonomy (control over their own life), which includes the obvious instances of abuse, sexual assault, and rape, but also things that further oppression (domination or exploitation of a group) or marginalization (exclusion of a group for the sake of securing another group's superior status) (because oppression and marginalization have the function of asserting the oppressing or privileged group's autonomy at the expense of the oppressed or marginalized group's autonomy). Thus, I believe the goal of a callout is to bring accountability for harm, to ask the harmdoer to confront the reality that they caused harm, stop the harm, and change the harmful behavior.
我覺得自己為「嗆聲」做的定義跟別人大部分的定義來比算是不尋常的中立。對我來說，不管私下或公開，網上或網外，嗆聲只不過是告訴別人做了一件有可能或真的有造成傷害的事。我按照總稱方式利用「傷害」這詞，用來形容任何威脅或損壞別人自治（掌控自己生活）的行為，顯而易見包括虐待、性侵和強暴，但也有包刮促進壓迫（征服或剝削一群）或邊緣化（為了保護另一群的優越地位排斥一群）的事（因為壓迫和邊緣化的作用就是以被壓迫者或被邊緣化群的自治做代價來維護壓迫者或特權群的自治）。因此，我認為嗆聲的目的就是傷害的問責，要求傷害者面對自己有創造傷害的事實、停止傷害、改變有害的行為。
I understand the concept of callouts in terms of Sara Ahmed's feminist praxis of killing joy. In “Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects)”, she says:
我是按照 Sara Ahmed 的女權敗興實踐來理解嗆聲的概念。在〈女權敗興者（和其他的任性主體）〉的文章之中，她說：
To be willing to go against a social order, which is protected as a moral order, a happiness order is to be willing to cause unhappiness, even if unhappiness is not your cause. To be willing to cause unhappiness might be about how we live an individual life (not to choose “the right path” is readable as giving up the happiness that is presumed to follow that path). Parental responses to coming out, for example, can take the explicit form not of being unhappy about the child being queer but of being unhappy about the child being unhappy. Even if you do not want to cause the unhappiness of those you love, a queer life can mean living with that unhappiness. To be willing to cause unhappiness can also be how we immerse ourselves in collective struggle, as we work with and through others who share our points of alienation. Those who are unseated by the tables of happiness can find each other.
願意違背某種社會制度，在道德方面被保護的制度，美滿制度，就是願意導致不滿，就算是不滿不是你的宗致。願意導致不滿可能跟個人生活的方式有關（不選擇「正確的路」可以被應作為放棄順路假定的美滿。）例如說，家長對出櫃的反應可能會是明確不是對孩子是酷兒的不滿而是對孩子有不滿的不滿。就算是你不想導致親人的不滿，酷兒的生活可能就是要對那種不滿認命。願意導致不滿可能也跟我們如何沉浸於集體鬥爭之中有關，當我們跟著和通過在同一點感到疏離的人一起合作。被美滿桌移出座位的人可以互相找到彼此。
So, yes, let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. Does the feminist kill other people's joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist subject “in the room” hence “brings others down” not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism but by exposing how happiness is sustained by erasing the signs of not getting along. Feminists do kill joy in a certain sense: they disturb the very fantasy that happiness can be found in certain places. To kill a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that feminists might not be happily affected by what is supposed to cause happiness, but our failure to be happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others.
所以，對，我們來認真地對待女權敗興者的人物。女權主義者是在指出性別歧視的時候掃除別人的美滿嗎？還是她在暴露公開喜悅表現之下被隱藏、移開或否定的不好情緒？不好情緒是在某人表露憤怒的時候出現在房間之內嗎，還是憤怒就是物體內循環的不好情緒的一種顯露？「在房間之內」的女權主體因此「讓別人消沉」，不只是因為提出像性別歧視一樣不開心的話題，也是因為暴露美滿是靠清除合不來的表現來維持的。女權主義者的確是在一種方面造成敗興：她們擾亂美滿能在某些地方找到的那個幻想。掃除幻想還是能掃除情緒。不只是因為女權主義者可能沒有被該造成美滿的東西快樂地感動，而也是因為我們對快樂的失敗被應作為破壞別人的美滿。
I feel like most people think a callout is when you publicly point out someone's wrongs for the purpose of publicly shaming them. There's a spectaclized implication, as I've written before, that the person making the callout is “imposing [their] authority” on everyone else, potentially illegitimately turning subjective wrongs into objective harm. Thus, the person making a callout is, as Sara Ahmed writes of feminist killjoys, “go[ing] against a social order, which is protected as a moral order, a happiness order,” and willfully “sabotaging the happiness of others.” Thus, I wish to problematize OP's problematization of callouts as “base, cruel, and violent.” The problem isn't callouts, but the mediation of social media platforms. The problem isn't that certain callouts are “base, cruel, and violent” to the point that they can't count as calls for accountability, but that we don't even understand what accountability is, especially in the imagined community of social media.
我覺得大部分的人好像認為嗆聲就是公開指出別人的錯，目的是為了要他人當眾羞辱。有種被景觀化的暗示，就像我所說的一樣，嗆聲者是在「強迫［大家］接受［他］的權威」，可能是在無理地把主觀的錯誤變成客觀的傷害。因此，就像 Sara Ahmed 描述女權敗興者說的一樣，嗆聲者是在「違背某種社會制度，在道德方面被保護的制度，美滿制度」，是在任性地「破壞別人的美滿」。因此，我要問題化 OP 把嗆聲作為「卑鄙、殘忍和暴力」的問題化。問題不是嗆聲，而是社交媒體平台的中介。問題不是某些嗆聲到不能算是在問責，而是我們連問責是什麼都搞不懂，尤其是當我們在社交媒體中想像的共同體之內。
In my personal experience, “accountability” in a primarily social-media-based community means that the harmdoer needs to socially disappear until the harmdoer has reduced their threat levels enough to permit their reappearance.
根據我的個人經驗，在個主要聚集在社交媒體平台上的社群之中，「問責」表示傷害者必須要在社交方面上消失，直到傷害者把自己的危害度降到可以容許重現的形象。
Problem 1: “the harmdoer needs to socially disappear.” This part is about getting the harmdoer to confront the reality that they caused harm, and stop them from doing more harm. However, when the only method you have for responding to harm is ostracism, everyone, regardless of their alleged or actual harm, may be ostracized because of a callout, even if ostracism is not necessary to accountability for every type of harm, which makes people skeptical towards calls for accountability. Many people's first response to a callout is to debate whether or not the harm justifies ostracism. They doubt whether or not harmdoers actually caused harm, uncritically dismissing callouts as baseless fearmongering or agreeing completely with every one for fear of being ostracized.
第一個問題：「傷害者必須要在社交方面上消失」。這部分是關於要讓傷害者面對自己有創造傷害的事實，阻止他們繼續創造更多的傷害。可是，當你唯一對付傷害的方法只有排斥，所有的人，不管他們所謂或真正的傷害是什麼，都有可能為了嗆聲被排斥，即使排斥不一定是每種傷害的問責必要條件，造成人們對要求問責的懷疑。排斥的單一解決方式妨礙到問責的過程。許多人對嗆聲的第一個反應就是開始爭為那種傷害排斥別人到底是不是正當的理由。他們懷疑傷害者到底有沒有真的造成傷害，不加批評地排除嗆聲說都是無根據的散布恐懼心理行為，或是怕被排斥怕到跟每個嗆聲都完全同意。
The worst case scenario is when people are dismissive of calls for accountability to the point of insisting on being apolitical or reactionary (catchphrase: “I'm just a [insert privileged identity here],” often employs insults about blue hair, pronouns in bio, SJWs, keyboard warriors, or tumblrinas). Alternatively, they will be agreeable to the point of becoming self-abusive or dysfunctionally scrupulous. In any case, ostracism no longer serves as a consequence of causing harm, as a way of stopping harm, but as a way of discipline, of defining acceptable boundaries of discourse.
最糟的情況是人家不理要求問責到堅持當非政治或反動份子的地步（口頭禪：「我只是個［在此處填入有特權的認同］」，經常嘲笑藍髮、個人資料有代詞、SJW、鍵盤戰士、tumblrina（貶抑千篇一律愛利用 tumblr 平台的 SJW，通常指女生））。要不，他們會同意到變成有自虐或失調的謹慎。總而言之，排斥不再是造成傷害的後果，不再是阻止傷害的方法，而是規訓的方法，是在為話語做出界限的界定。
Sometimes, ostracism can turn into its own kind of harm. People of oppressed classes are often ostracized over perceived harms that would have been overlooked if they were in their respective oppressors' classes. Some oppressors or opportunistic social climber types will take advantage of this system that exclusively relies on ostracism for accountability, manufacturing or overstating harm to ostracize people they want out of the way.
有時，排斥可能會變成自立的傷害。在被壓迫階級的人常會因為認為有創造的傷害被排斥，但如果他們是在各自壓迫者的階級的話，這些傷害反而會被忽略。某些壓迫者或愛投機的攀高枝者類人會用這個唯一只靠排斥來問責的系統來佔便宜，亂創或誇大傷害來排斥他們希望解決掉的人。
On the flip side, questioning the praxis of ostracism shouldn't turn into a debate about the perception of harm, and especially not into the gaslighting and retraumatizing of harmed people. This kind of risk is why I don't think callouts and the people who make callouts should be problematized, no matter what the callout's content is. I will never debate other people's perceptions of harm. Again, harm to me is not just a subjective feeling of pain, but behavior that threatens or damages someone else's autonomy, a precise kind of pain caused by that kind of behavior. I am not interested in debating whether or not your subjective feeling of pain is “valid.” If necessary, what I'll debate are the political assumptions behind the behavior's interpretation. To disagree with the politics and praxis of the person making the callout should not be conflated with invalidating their pain. That conflation is related to problem 2, the assumptions behind what it takes to create safety for person who made the callout.
反而言之，疑問排斥的實踐不該變成開啟認識傷害能力的爭論，而且特別不能變成情感操縱和再次創傷被傷害的人。這種危險就是我認為嗆聲和創造嗆聲的人不該被問題化的原因，不管嗆聲的內容是怎樣。別人認識傷害能力我永遠不會去爭。再說一遍，傷害對我來說不只是主觀的痛苦感覺，而是威脅或損壞別人自治的行為，是那種行為造成的確切痛苦。我沒有興趣去爭你主觀痛苦的感覺到底有沒有「合理」。如果有必要的話，要爭的是行為解釋背後的政治性臆斷。不同意嗆聲者的政治和實踐不該跟不在乎嗆聲者的痛苦混淆。那種混淆是跟第二個問題有關，關於為嗆聲者創造安全的必要條件的背後臆斷。
Problem 2: “until the harmdoer has reduced their threat levels enough to permit their reappearance.” This part is about getting the harmdoer to change their behavior. In theory, those who were harmed get to decide when their harmdoers have become unthreatening enough to socially reappear. However, as Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha observes with partner abuse, it mostly “comes down to a popularity contest”—if the harmdoer was popular enough they can ignore harmed people's terms, often refusing to disappear at all, with the support of the public.
第二個問題：「直到傷害者把自己的危害度降到可以容許重現的形象」。這部分是關於改變傷害者的行為。在理論上，傷害者不再有威脅到能容許重現的狀態是由被傷害的人來判斷。可是，就跟 Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha 在伴侶虐待方面觀察的一樣，大部分「歸根結底就是人氣競賽」—如果傷害者人氣足夠的話，他能不理被傷害的人的條件，經常拒絕消失，而且會被大眾支持。
Sometimes those who were harmed have no idea what a harmdoer reducing their threat levels looks like; this is normal. What frustrates me is when harmed people, reacting from a place of trauma, completely reject the possibility that any of their harmdoers can ever reduce their threat levels, and they need everyone else around them to agree in order to feel safe. What frustrates me is the collective choice to enable instead of work through this kind of maladaptive trauma response, the insistence on splitting and being split on as praxis, which is a praxis that social media, as a medium that disciplines users through the threat of ostracism, is designed to encourage.
有時候被傷害的人完全不知道傷害者怎樣才能降低自己的危害度；這很正常。讓我感到煩惱的是被傷害的人，因為是在從創傷的地位反應，完全拒絕傷害者能降低自己危害度的前途，而且需要旁邊全部的人跟他同意才能感到安全。讓我感到煩惱的是大家決定不消化，反而贊助這種適應不良的創傷因應，堅持把分裂和被分作為實踐, 也就是社交媒體，作為利用排斥的威脅來規訓使用者的媒體，在設計中鼓勵的實踐。
For those who believe harmdoers will never actually reduce their threat levels, accountability just becomes “the harmdoer needs to socially disappear.” The harmdoer must confront the reality of causing harm and stop doing it, but paradoxically they cannot change. The harmdoer must cease to be harmful while continuing to play the role of the harmdoer by remaining permanently ostracized, and this is called accountability. The harmdoer is viewed as a lost cause, and changing the harmdoer becomes equated to apologia for harm. In this system, community is held together by a collective agreement to give up on ending harm; it's good enough to displace harm outside the community, and if you care about who's outside then get the fuck out.
對相信傷害者永遠不會降低自己危害度的人來說，問責變成只有「傷害者必須要在社交方面上消失」的條件。傷害者必須面對自己有創造傷害的事實和停止傷害，可是矛盾地不能改變。傷害者必須停止自己的有害，可是需要繼續扮演傷害者的角色接受永遠的排斥，而且這就是所謂的問責。傷害者被視為是無可救藥，傷害者的改變和傷害的辯護混爲一談。在這系統之下，共同體是靠著放棄結束傷害的集體協議來保持團結；傷害能移到共同體的外面就好，愛關心誰在外面的話就給我滾出去。
In “Of Complaints and Apologies: Feminist Theses Against Carceralism,” Madeline Lane-McKinley writes:
在〈抱怨跟道歉之間：反對監獄主義的女權論點〉的文章之中，Madeline Lane-McKinley 說：
When a complaint is spoken, a feminist practice entails listening for how to care. Yet all too often complaints are met without any care – their implications, immediately, become enwrapped in a carceral logic.
當抱怨被說出來，女權主義的實施有聽好如何關心的必要。然而抱怨太常不會被關心 – 馬上，它們的意味被監獄性的邏輯包圍住。
Collective care, however, may not look like “transformative justice.” Perhaps justice cannot be. Nothing can be undone. Instead of justice, and instead of punishment, the problem is, as in the case of redemption, that of revolutionary possibility. Much is discussed of the necessity — or non-necessity — of violence in revolution. This is a different question, though not unrelated. There is not a binary opposition between violence and care. Yet care is the very basis of revolution: revolutionary possibilities emerge in contexts of collectivity, mutuality, and care. These are contexts of shared experience, shared struggle, and shared survival.
集體的關心，然而，不一定會看起來像是「轉型正義」。或許正義得不了。做的事不能被取消。與其正義，與其懲罰，問題不如，跟贖罪的情況一樣，是革命性的前途。有許多的討論關於暴力在革命的必要 — 或不必。這是不同的問題，但也並不沒相關。暴力跟關心的關係不是兩元的對立。然而關心正是革命的基礎：革命性的前途是出現在集體、相互和關心的背景之間。這些是共同的經驗、共同的鬥爭和共同的求生的背景。
The internet is where care goes to die. The so-called “community” found on social media is imagined through parasocial interactions, and we've got to stop confusing these interactions with care. Accountability on the internet is a chimeric beast, because we are a collective without collectivity. We do not have “shared experience, shared struggle, and shared survival,” we have something more akin to shared exchanges: posts we like and boost, profiles we friend, follow, mute, and block, comments we read, reply to, screenshot and circulate. We think these spectaclized representations mean shared experience, struggle, and survival. When we find out it doesn't, we implode. This anathema towards outsiders in online communities is the pain of implosion, the pain of betrayal from those we imagined as comrades. So-called “callout” or “cancel culture” is an attempt to escape this pain through the rigorous expulsion of false comrades. And I do not have the heart to condemn anyone for wishing to avoid pain, no matter how problematic their ways. Instead I want to deconstruct the conditions that caused them to utilize those ways.
網路就是關心的送死之地。所謂在社交媒體上的「共同體」是依靠擬社會人際互動而想像出來的；拜託我們不要再把這些互動當成關心。網路上的問責是個嵌合的毛病，因為我們是沒有集體性的集體。我們並沒有「共同的經驗、共同的鬥爭和共同的求生」，我們比較有的是共同的交流：能按讚或轉發的 po 文、能增加、跟隨、靜音、封鎖的個人檔案、能被讀、被回復、被擷取和傳出去的留言。我們認為這些被景觀化的表現代表就是有共同的經驗、鬥爭和求生。當發現沒有的時候，我們就會內爆。網路社群對外人的深惡痛絕就是這內爆的痛苦，被我們想像為同志的人背叛的痛苦。這痛苦就是所謂的「嗆聲」或「取消文化」試圖通過假同志的嚴厲開除試圖避開的事。而我不忍心指責任何希望避開痛苦的人，不管他們方式多麼有問題。我反而要的是解構導致他們使用那些方式的條件。
I suspect that the reason parasocial interactions online have taken the place of care is because people are not finding care in the real world offline. I know, for some people, this spectaclized community really is all they have. To change that requires connecting and organizing beyond the scope of the internet. Within the internet, “I” am nothing but representations all the way down. “I” can't care about “you,” and “you” can't care about “me.” To quote Wendy Trevino: “Mostly, I have questions / & don’t want to find myself. I’d rather / Look at my choices & yours. Yup. Nope. Yup.”
我猜想網路的擬社會人際互動代替關心的原因就是因為人們在網路外的現實世界找不到關心。我知道，對某些人來說，真的就只有這被景觀化的共同體。要改變的話必須超越網路的範圍去聯繫和組織。在網路之中，「我」只不過是無盡的表現。「我」無法關心「你」，「你」也無法關心「我」。引用 Wendy Trevino 的話來說： 「大多，我有問題 / 而且不想發現自己。我寧願 / 看看我和你的選擇。行。不行。行。」
需要（在政治方面）有「做點事」的感覺不小心的話會讓你很容易被利用